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Board structure, political influence and firm 
performance -An empirical study on publicly 
listed firms in China 
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"Tulane University 
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Abstract 
The board of directors is the cornerstone of any effective corporate governance system. A well-
structured board can effectively monitor and motivate management of a company for the benefit ofthe 
company's shareholders. This paper investigates the relationship between board structure and firm 
performance using a sample of 490 publicly listed firms in China. The characteristics of board struc-
ture we examined include: board size, inside/outside/independent directors, CEO/Chair duality, stock 
holdings of directors, rewards to directors and aged directors. We find significant relationship between 
firm performance and three characteristics: the rewards to director, the stock holdings of directors and 
the existence of independent directors. We also find political influences on the effectiveness of boards. 
When state ownership is more than 50% (state-dominating), rewards and stock holdings of directors 
are useful. When state ownership is less than 50% (non-state-dominating), the existence of independ-
ent directors comes into effect. In addition, our analyses indicate that state ownership affects firm 
performance. State ownership is positively related to firm performance in state-dominating groups 
while negatively related to firm performance in non-state-ownership groups. 
JEL Classifications: G34, G3 
Keywords: corporate governance; board structure; political influence; firm performance; 
empirical study 
' Dongping Han, Fusheng Wang are at School of Management, Harbin Institution of Technology, 
Heilongjiang, 150001 PR China. Heng Yue is at Abfreeman School of Business, Tulane University, New 
Orleans, LA 70118, USA. Correspondence to Heng Yue, Rm451, 7 McAlister Drive, New Orleans, LA70118, 
USA. Email: hyue@tulane.edu. 
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Introduction 
Dongping Han, Fusheng Wang, and Heng Yue 
Asia-Pac(fic Journal of Accounting & Economics 11 (2004) 77-94 
In modern corporations ownership and management are separated. This separation 
generates conflicts of interests between managers and shareholders (Jensen 1986): 
managers may act for their own interests at the expense of the benefits of shareholders. To 
mitigate the agency problem firms set up boards of directors. 1 A board of directors takes 
two roles in the modern corporation: monitoring and motivating. An effective board of 
directors can monitor managers and therefore reduce management's opportunistic activi-
ties, advise management on crucial decisions and replace incapable managers if necessary. 
The board can also design appropriate compensation plans to align the interests of manag-
ers with those of shareholders so that managers have more incentives to work for the 
benefits of shareholders. Both monitoring and motivating roles should mitigate conflicts 
of interest and lead to the improvement of a firm's performance.2 
Previous academic research has extensively examined whether certain board struc-
tures are associated with better firm performance in order to understand what kind of 
boards are more effective. The characteristics of board structure that have been examined 
include: board size (Yermack 1996; Gary and Anne 1998), inside/outside directors 
(Hermalin and Weisbach 1991; Baysinger and Butler 1985; Rosenstein and Wyatt 1990, 
etc), CEO/Chair duality (Yermack 1996; Pi and Timme 1993; Brickley, Coles and Jarrell 
1997), stock ownership of directors (Morek, Shleifer and Vishny 1988; McConnell and 
Servaes 1990; Core, Holthausen and Larcker 1999), rewards to directors (Boyd 1994; 
Finkelstein and Hambrick 1989; Yermack 2002), aged directors (Core et al., 1999). Most 
of the empirical studies focus on large firms in the United States and the evidence from the 
literature is only mixed. 
This paper investigates the relationship between board structure and firm performance 
using data from publicly listed firms in China. The Chinese government opened stock 
exchanges in the early 1990s. In about 12 years, China's stock markets have grown to 
become the eighth largest in the world with more than 1 ,000 listed stocks and a total 
market capitalisation of over US$500 billion. 3 Although China's stock markets have grown 
quickly, listed firms in China face many special problems regarding corporate govern-
ance. For example, most of the publicly listed firms in China were originally state-owned 
enterprises (SOEs), run using a bureaucratic structure. No regulations about managers 
have been published. Investors have no experience of monitoring managers. In addition 
there is no market for directors, therefore there are none of the incentives associated with 
1 In theory, the board of directors is the first mechanism that shareholders could use to control and influence 
managers' behavior (see Jensen 1993). Other corporate governance mechanisms include: high corporate leverage 
(Jensen 1986), managerial compensation (Hubbard and Palia 1995), and more transparent disclosure. Because 
the compensation plans are designed and approved by the board of directors, managerial compensation is 
closely related with board. See Core, Holthausen and Larcker ( 1999) for the influence of board on the 
compensations and firm performance. 
'See Monks and Min ow ( 1995) for detailed discussion about the role of the board of directors. 
·
1 The Shanghai Security Exchange was opened in December 1990 and the Shenzhen Stock Exchange was 
opened in July 1991. The first batch of lPOs was restricted to citizens of China (A shares). Later, Chinese 
companies also issued B shares to foreign investors (from January 1992) and H shares on the Stock Exchange 
of Hong Kong (from 1993). See Aharony et al., (2000). 
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director appointments:' When establishing the stock market, China followed foreign 
countries and made regulations governing boards of directors. For example, boards of 
directors are required to have more than five members and are to meet every year (see 
China's Security Law). However the requirements are rudimentary and provide no de-
tailed guidance on issues such as external directors, compensation, etc. Therefore it is very 
interesting to know how the board structures of Chinese firms work, whether the boards 
are effective, and whether specific board structure can influence firm performance. Our 
paper intends to address the above questions. 
Our paper is related to Bai eta!., (2002), who examined corporate governance and firm 
valuation in China. They found that investors assign a premium to those firms with better 
corporate governance, measured using a self-constructed G index. Our paper is different 
in that we focus on firms' operating performance, as measured by return of equity (ROE), 
in contrast to their market valuation. We choose operating performance for two reasons. 
First we believe a study on the relationship between operating performance and board 
structure is more useful for China's policy making. An official statistic suggests that only 
about one-third of SOEs are profitable, the others are either losing money or just breaking 
even. Ineffective governance has been widely believed to be the underlying reason. By 
pushing those companies to the market and transforming them into modern corporate 
structures, the Chinese government expects an improvement in operating performance. 
Therefore if we can associate specific board structures with better operating performance, 
it is helpful for policy makers. Second, market valuation is based on the hypothesis of 
market efficiency, which an emerging market like China is unlikely to have. Our measure-
ment based on accounting variables does not rely on this hypothesis. Also our study focuses 
on and examines more aspects of board structure. Bai et a!., (2002) examine two charac-
teristics about the board. One is the dummy for CEO/Chair duality (CEO serves 
simultaneously as chair of the board) and the other is the percentage of external directors 
on the board. In our study we examine six aspects of board structure. 
When investigating the effects of board structure on firm performance we need 
to consider political influence in China. Most listed firms are transformed from SOEs. More 
importantly, the state usually holds the largest number of shares, often more than 50 per cent, 
after the firms go public. Therefore the political influence of the central government is con-
siderable. When deciding the state ownership of the firm, the Chinese government has a 
policy that it will retain tight control of more important firms, while loosening control of 
others.5 So the number of shares the state owns can indicate how tightly the state intends to 
control the firm. Firms with dominant state ownership are under direct supervision of the 
State Council. They act more like government agencies and often receive policy benefit or 
direct subsidies (see Far Eastern Economic Review, 11 November 1993, P. 72). Managers of 
these firms often hold important government positions before their appointment and some 
have political ambitions for the future. Firms without dominant state ownership are less 
likely to be influenced by the government. Their managers are professional managers. Thus 
when we investigate the role of board structure we need to consider political influence. 
~ Fama and Jensen (1983) argue that directors have incentives to develop reputations and to signal to 
internal and external markets. 
5 Aharony, Lee and Wong (2000) found that the state holds more shares in firms from "protected industries" 
compared with firms from "unprotected industries". 
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Using a sample of 490 publicly listed firms in China, we examined several charac-
teristics of board structure, including board size, inside/outside/independent directors, 
CEO/Chair duality, stock ownership of directors, rewards to directors, and aged direc-
tors. We found significant relationships between firm performance and three factors: 
the rewards to directors, the existence of independent directors and percentage of share 
holdings of directors. The results hold even after taking into account state ownership. 
The evidence indicates that specific board structures do help to improve firm per-
formance in China. Specifically the lack of a market for directors and incentive from 
reputation make the rewards to directors important. Ownership of directors helps align 
the interests of director with the whole firm. Independent directors also help to effec-
tively monitor firms. 
We further divided the sample into two groups (state-dominated vs. non-state-
dominated) based on state ownership being larger or smaller than 50 per cent. We exam-
ined the relationship between firm performance and the characteristics of board structure 
in each group. For non-state-dominated firms, we found significantly positive coeffi-
cients for the rewards to directors and percentage of share holdings of directors. For 
state-dominated firms, we found significantly positive coefficients for the existence of 
independent directors, while rewards and ownership were not significant. Therefore the 
effectiveness of boards is affected by state ownership. In addition, and more interest-
ingly, we found that state ownership is positively related to performance for 
state-dominated firms and negatively for non-state-dominated firms. As we have ex-
plained before, state-dominated firms are supervised by the state council. More state 
shares means closer relationships with the government and therefore these firms are 
more likely to receive policy benefits. Non-state-dominated firms are more like inde-
pendent firms. Less state shares indicate less interference from the government. Overall, 
the evidence suggests that political influence has an important effect on both the role of 
the board of directors and firm performance. 
The remainder of the paper is organized as follows: section 2 discusses related litera-
ture; section 3 describes the data, methodology and variable definitions; section 4 presents 
empirical results and section 5 concludes the paper. 
2. Related studies 
Board structure has attracted the attention of researchers in analytical and empirical 
fields for a long period. Characteristics of board structure that have been examined in-
clude: board size, inside/outside/independent directors, CEO/Chair duality, rewards to 
directors, stock ownership of directors and aged directors. In this section we will give a 
brief review of the related studies. 
Board Size 
Lipton and Lorsch ( 1992) believe that when the board becomes bigger, directors are 
less likely to criticise the policies of top managers, take risk, or hold candid discussion 
about corporate performance. They recommend limiting the board size to ten persons, with 
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a preferred size of eight or nine. Jensen (1993) argues that a big board leads to the "great 
emphasis on politeness and courtesy at the expense of truth and frankness in boardrooms" 
and states that "when boards get beyond seven or eight people they are less likely to 
function effectively and are easier for the CEO to control". 
Empirical evidence is generally consistent with the notion. Using a sample of 452 
large US public firms, Yermack ( 1996) finds an inverse relation between firm market 
value, as measured by Tobin's Q, and the size of the board of directors. The loss in firm 
value also increases when boards become large. Gary and Anne ( 1998) provide support-
ing evidence that small boards are more effective by examining financial distress in 
banking firms. 
Inside/Outside/Independent Directors 
Inside directors are those directors who are simultaneously managers of the firm while 
outside directors are those directors who are not managers. Whether inside or outside 
directors are better for the firm has been discussed for many years. Proponents of outside 
directors argue that inside directors share the same conflict of interest problems as 
management and are more easily influenced by the CEO. Fama ( 1980) and Fama and 
Jensen ( 1983) advocate that outside directors are crucial to the monitoring role of the 
boards. Proponents of inside directors believe that managers are inherently trustworthy 
and control should be centralized in the hands of firm managers (see for example, Donaldson 
1990). Estes ( 1980) argue that it is very hard for outsiders to understand the complexities 
of the firms and to monitor managers' activities. 
During the 1990s there has been a global trend towards requiring more outside 
directors. At least 18 countries have witnessed publication of guidelines that stipulate 
minimum numbers for the representation of outside directors on corporate boards. 
However the empirical studies provide only mixed support for this view. Baysinger 
and Butler ( 1985) find that companies perform better if the boards have more outsid-
ers. Rosenstein and Wyatt ( 1990) find that the announcement of new outside directors 
is associated with positive abnormal returns. Byrd and Hickman (1992) find that when 
inside directors hold a very high proportion of board seats bidding firms receive higher 
abnormal returns. Lee et a!., ( 1992) present evidence that outsider-dominance firms 
earn higher stock returns than insider-dominance firms in the case of management 
buyout. Although evidence favoring outside directors is plentiful, other studies find 
no relationship or favouring of inside directors. Yermack (1996) and Hermalin and 
Weisbach ( 1991) find no significant relationship between firm performance and the 
fraction of outside directors. Vance ( 1978) finds that technical expertise and manage-
rial experience of inside directors is helpful for corporate performance. Bhagat and 
Black (2002) find no correlation between outside directors and a company's long-
term performance. 
Outside directors by definition include those independent directors, who have no 
relationship with managers or other large shareholders, and outside directors who are 
not managers but have some relationship with managers or largest shareholders. The 
independent directors are real outsiders and the above discussions apply similarly. 
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CEO/Chair Duality 
CEO/Chair duality means that the CEO serves simultaneously as the chairman of the 
board. The issue of CEO/Chair Duality can be seen as an extension from the issue of 
outsider and insider. Jensen (1993) argues that board chair and CEO should be separated, 
otherwise it will be "extremely difficult for the board to respond early to failure in its top 
management team." Yermack (1996) suggests that agency problems are higher when the 
CEO is also the board chair. In contrast, Brickley et al., (1997) argue that separating titles 
will introduce the agency costs of controlling the behavior of the non-CEO chairman and 
dilute the CEO's power to provide effective leadership. 
The CEO/Chair duality is a very common phenomenon in the US, where over 75 per 
cent of large firms have CEO/Chair duality (National Association of Corporate Directors 
1998). However empirical evidence on whether CEO/Chair duality is good for firm per-
formance is mixed. Pi and Timme ( 1993) examine a sample of banks between 1987 and 
1990 and find that firms with separate titles have better performance. Daily and Dalton 
(1994) examine 57 bankruptcy firms and find that 53.8 per cent of the failing firms have 
dual structure while the figure in matched firms is 37 per cent. In contrast Baliga, Moyer 
and Rao ( 1996) and Brickley, Coles and Jarrell ( 1997) find no evidence that separating the 
titles lead to improved firm performance. 
Stock Ownership of Directors 
Jensen (1993) argues that share holdings of directors can provide incentives for di-
rectors to seek opportunities to maximize shareholder's value. It also helps align the 
interests of directors with the firm. Morek, Shleifer and Vishny (1988) find significant 
associations between different levels of director ownership and Tobin's Q, though the 
relationship is not monotonic. McConnell and Servaes ( 1990), Hermalin and Weisbach 
( 1991) and Kaplan ( 1994) also provide supporting evidence. In contrast Gary and Anne 
(1998) find larger proportion of directors with share holdings leads to worse firm per-
formance. 
Rewards to Directors 
Appropriate rewards provide an incentive for directors. Yermack (2002) finds direc-
tors in good-performance firms have higher compensations. Researchers also related rewards 
with other characteristics of board structure. Boyd (1994) finds a positive relationship 
between rewards to directors and the proportion of outside directors while Finkelstein and 
Hambrick (1989) find no such relationship. 
Aged Directors 
Directors may become less effective as they grow older since their capabilities and 
energy levels may decrease. NACD guideline ( 1996) suggests a mandatory retirement age 
for directors. Core et al., (1999) find that aged directors can influence CEO's compensa-
tion, while the latter is related to firm performance. 
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In summary, voluminous studies have investigated the relationship between different 
aspects of board structure and firm performance. However the available evidence is often 
mixed and no final conclusion has yet been reached. 
3. Sample and variables definitions 
3.1 Sample selection 
This study aims to examine the relationship between board structure and firm perform-
ance in China. Our initial sample includes all 1,103 firms listed on the Shanghai Stock 
Exchange and the Shenzhen Stock Exchange. We gather data on boards of directors from 
the abstracts of the public reports in year 2000 from China Securities, Shanghai Securities 
News and Securities Express.6 We exclude those firms without information about their 
board of directors or without enough information to distinguish the members of the board 
of directors from the members of the Supervisor Committee and from the senior manag-
ers. We also eliminate those companies with extreme weighted average ROE, which is our 
measure of firm performance. The final sample includes 490 public listed firms with all 
necessary data. Because data was hand collected our study is restricted to one year. 
3.2 Measurement of performance 
We use weighted average ROE as our measurement of firm performance. The formula 
to calculate ROE is as follows: 
ROE= p 
E0 +Ei xMi+M0 -EjxMj+M0 ' 
Where Pis net income, E0 is net assets of beginning; E; is net assets newly added due to 
new stock issuing or bond converted; E is net assets newly reduced because of repurchas-
J 
ing of stock in report period or cash dividend, M0 is the amount of report period month, M; 
is the amount of month of net assets newly added from next month to the end of report 
period and M is the number of month of net assets newly reduced from next month to end 
J 
of report period. The use of weighted average ROE takes consideration of the changes of 
equity during the period, which are very common in an emerging stock market. 
As we explained before, we prefer accounting performance measurement to stock 
valuation for two reasons. First, it is policy-oriented. We believe results on the relationship 
between operating performance and board structure are more interesting and helpful for 
policy makers. Second, our measurement does not rely on the market efficiency hypothesis. 
6 The Chinese government requires that all information about listed firms must be published in at least 
one of these three newspapers. 
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3.3 Variables and descriptive statistics 
In this paper, we examine six aspects of board structure: board size, inside/outside/ 
independent directors, CEO/Chair duality, stock ownership of directors, reward to direc-
tors and aged directors. Definitions of the variables are presented in Table I. 
Table 1 
Variable Definitions 
Variables 
1. Board Size 
SIZE 
DSIZE 
2. Inside/Outside!Indep. Directors 
PlNSIDE 
PINDEP 
DINDEP 
3. CEO/Chair Duality 
DUAL 
4. Stock Ownership of Directors 
PNSHARE 
PSHARE(%) 
5. Rewards to Directors 
PNREWARD 
REWARD 
6. Aged Directors 
PAGE 
Other Variables 
ROE(%) 
STATE(%) 
DSTATE 
Definition 
Number of director members in the board 
I if number of directors is bigger than 9, 0 otherwise 
Percentage of inside directors 
Percentage of independent directors in the board 
1 if there is an independent directors in board and 0 otherwise 
1 if CEO also holds Chair of the board and 0 otherwise 
Percentage of director with ownership in the firm 
Average percentage of shares in the board 
Percentage of directors that receive rewards 
Average of rewards to directors 
Percentage of aged directors (age>=60) 
Return of equity. defined in the text 
Percentage of state ownership 
I if state ownership is more than 50%, and 0 otherwise 
Board size is measured using the number of directors in the board (SIZE) and a dummy 
variable (DSIZE) that takes one if the number of directors is more than nine and zero 
otherwise. We choose nine as the cutoff because the median of board size is nine. From 
Table 2 we know that on average the board of directors consists of nine members with the 
maximum 18 and minimum 5. The figures are comparable to board size in America and 
Canada. Rao and Lee-sing (1996) report that the average numbers of directors in Cana-
dian and American firms are 9.25 and 9.85 respectively. The Security Law in China requires 
the board to have more than five members. 
We use percentage of inside directors (PINS IDE) and percentage of independent di-
rectors (PINDEP) to measure the composition of the board between inside, outside and 
independent directors. Table 2 indicates that, on average, more than one quarter of direc-
tors are also managers in the firms. Independent directors are much less of a proportion, 
with an average of only one per cent. We also include a dummy variable DINDEP to 
indicate that the board has at least one independent director. 
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Table 2 
Descriptive Statistics 
Mean Median STD MAX MIN 
1. Board Size 
SIZE 10.96 9 2.61 18 5 
DSIZE 0.42 0 0.49 0 
2. Inside/Outside!lndep. Directors 
PINSIDE (%) 26 23 19 100 0 
PINDEP(%) I 0 5 38 0 
DINDEP 0.08 0 0.28 0 
3. CEO/Chair Duality 
DUAL 0.14 0 0.35 0 
4. Stock Ownership of Directors 
PNSHARE(%) 38 33 34 100 0 
PSHARE(%) 0.12 0.01 1.61 35.5 0 
5. Rewards to Directors 
PNREWARD (%) 46 46 29 100 0 
REWARD 6.81 5 7.03 75.4 0 
6. Aged Directors 
PAGE(%) 8 0 II 80 0 
Other variables 
ROE(%) 10.93 10.46 9.63 64.19 -89 
STATE(%) 46.66 46.05 18.50 99 3.77 
DSTATE 0.45 0 0.50 0 
Note: Variable definitions in Table I. 
We use a dummy variable DUAL to indicate that CEO also holds the Chair of the 
board. From our sample, we can see that only 14 per cent of firms have CEO/Chair duality, 
which is far less than the 75 per cent in US firms. 
We use the fraction of directors that own shares (PNSHARE) and the average percent-
age of shares that board members hold (PSHARE) to measure the characteristics of stock 
ownership of directors. Table 2 indicates that not all directors hold shares and even if they 
do, the percentage of shares is very low. On average 38 per cent of directors own shares in 
the firm and the average shares owned by directors are merely 0.12 per cent. 
We use the fraction of directors that receive rewards from the firm (PNREWARD) and 
the average of rewards to directors (REWARD) to measure the rewards to directors. Table 
2 indicates that 46 per cent of directors receive rewards averaging at 6,810 RMB. 
Directors who are 60 years of age or older are defined as aged directors. We choose 60 
years as the cutoff because it is the age of retirement in China. We use the percentage of 
aged directors (PAGE) to measure the characteristics of aged directors. On average eight 
per cent of directors are aged directors. 
We also have variables to measure the state ownership of the firm (STATE), which is 
the percentage of state shares. In our sample, 46.66 per cent of shares are held by the 
central government. DSTATE takes one if state ownership is bigger than 50 per cent and 
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zero otherwise. We use it to divide the whole sample into state-dominated and non-
state-dominated groups. Table 2 indicates that this criterion places 46 per cent of firms 
into the state-dominated group and the remaining 54 per cent into non-state-dominated 
group. ROE is return of equity, our measurement of operating performance. The average 
of ROE is around II per cent. 
4. Empirical results 
Table 3 presents the correlations matrix between board structure, political influence 
and operating performance. In examining the relationship between independent variables 
measuring board structure, we find that most correlations are pretty low, except those 
dummy variables with their underlying variables (for example, SIZE and DSIZE, PINDEP 
and DINDEP, STATE and DSTATE). This indicates that collinearity will not be a problem 
if we do not include both dummy and their underlying variable at the same time. 
The last row of Table 3 presents the correlation between ROE and other variables. 
Three variables are significantly related to ROE: dummy for independent directors 
(DINDEP), average reward to directors (REWARD), and average percentage of shares 
holding (PSHARE). DINDEP is positively related to ROE, which means the existence of 
independent directors helps to improve firm performance. REWARD is positively related 
to ROE, which suggests that the rewards to directors provide incentives to directors. 
PSHARE is positively related to ROE, which is consistent with the notion that the inter-
ests of directors with stock ownership are more aligned with those of the firm. We find no 
significant correlations between ROE and board size, insider directors, aged directors or 
duality. The state ownership is not significantly related to ROE either. 
Table4 
Regressions of ROE on characteristics of board 
(1) (2) 
Coeff P-value Coeff P-value 
Intercept 8.72 0.001 8.65 0.001 
REWARD 0.20 0.001 0.20 0.002 
PSHARE 0.68 0.010 0.67 0.013 
DINDEP 2.39 0.123 2.08 0.195 
DSTATE 1.38 0.110 1.35 0.126 
SIZE 0.07 0.686 
DUAL 0.84 0.528 
PAGE 1.62 0.684 
PNREWARD -1.09 0.512 
PIN SIDE -1.14 0.671 
R-square 3.6% 2.8% 
Note: Variable definitions in Table I. 
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Table 4 shows multivariate regressions of ROE on characteristics of board. In regres-
sion (1) we used the variables that we found significantly related to performance in the 
correlation analysis plus DSTATE to control the effects of state ownership. Consistent 
with previous results, REWARD, PSHARE are significant at one per cent and three per 
cent respectively, which suggests appropriate incentive and share holding can help firms 
improve performance. DINDEP is now significant at 12 per cent after controlling other 
factors. DSTATE is significant at 11 per cent, which is consistent with Xu and Wang 
( 1997) that higher concentrated ownership by state is associated with higher performance. 
It is also consistent with that firms with more state ownership receive state benefits. 
Regression (2) includes other variables for board characteristics. The results are consistent 
with those in regression (I). Other variables have no significant coefficients. REWARD 
and PSHARE remain significant at 1 per cent. DINDEP is positive but is not significant. 
The inclusion of other variables decreases R-square from 3.6 per cent to 2.8 per cent, 
which makes us prefer the more parsimonious regression (1). 
As we explained before, political influence in China is an obvious factor. To further 
investigate the interaction between political influence, firm performance and board 
characteristics, we divide the whole sample into two groups: state-dominated and non-
state-dominated. The state-dominated group includes firms with state ownership of more 
than 50 per cent while the non-state-dominated group includes firms with state ownership 
less than 50 per cent. We first examine whether political forces affect the board structure. 
Table 5 compares the means of board structures between the two groups. Two variables 
are significant. PNREWARD in the state-dominated group is less than that in the non-
state-dominated group, which suggests that either those firms do not provide enough 
incentives or they rely on other channels, for example the promotion in the bureaucratic 
system. PAGE in the state-dominated group is larger than that in the non-state-dominated 
Table 5 
The political influence on board structure 
State-Dominating Non-state Dominating Difference P-value 
Size 9.55 9.59 -0.04 0.87 
PINS IDE 27.51 25.5 2.01 0.23 
PINDEP 1.84 1.1 0.74 0.12 
DINDEP 0.1 0.07 0.03 0.23 
DURA 0.12 0.15 -0.03 0.38 
PSHARE 2.99 18.49 -15.5 0.29 
PNSHARE 37.47 37.49 -0.02 0.99 
REWARD 6.41 7.17 -0.76 0.24 
PNREWARD 42.56 47.9 -5.34 0.04 
PAGE 8.97 6.72 2.25 0.03 
ROE 11.61 10.42 1.19 0.17 
Note: State-Dominated group includes firms with state ownership more than 50 per cent. Non-State-Dominated 
group includes firms with state ownership less than 50 per cent. Other variables defined in table I. 
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group, which indicates that the government uses more old directors. Other variables do not 
make a significant difference between the two groups. The state-dominated group has 
higher ROE, but the difference is insignificant. 
The political forces can not only affect board structure, but also affect how the board 
plays the role. For example, close state controls may limit the effectiveness of the boards. 
We therefore ran regressions of ROE on board structure variables in state-dominated and 
non-state-dominated groups respectively. The results are presented in Table 6. In the non-
state-dominated group, REWARD and PSHARE are significant which is consistent with 
previous results. DINDEP is not significant. In the state-dominated group, REWARD and 
PSHARE are not significant anymore while DINDEP is significant at one per cent. The 
results indicate that different board characteristics take effect according to different levels 
of state ownership. We also find that state ownership is negatively related to performance 
(significant at 0.126) in the non-state-dominated group while positively related with per-
formance (significant at less than 0.01) in the state-dominated groups. Our explanation of 
the phenomenon is as follows. State-dominated firms are supervised by central govern-
ment. More state shares means a closer relationship with the government and the firm is 
therefore more likely to receive policy benefits. Non-state-dominated firms are more like 
independent firms. Less state ownership indicates less interference from the government. 
As a robustness check, we also include other independent variables in each of the regres-
sion and find no significant coefficients, which is consistent with the results from the 
whole sample. In summary the evidence suggests that political influence has an important 
effect on both the role of board of directors and firm performance. 
5. Robustness tests 
5.1 Control firm size and industry effects 
The above regressions indicate that the board structure and political factors can influ-
ence firm performance. Because firm performance may be affected by many other factors, 
Table 6 
Regressions of ROE on characteristics of boards conditional on state ownership 
(!)STATE-Dominating (2)Non- STATE Dominating 
Coeff P-value Coeff P-value 
Intercept 0.50 0.895 11.59 0.001 
REWARD 0.06 0.514 0.26 0.002 
PSHARE -0.75 0.820 0.63 0.034 
DINDEP 3.41 0.059 0.29 0.909 
STATE 0.16 0.006 -0.10 0.126 
#ofOBS 219 271 
R-square 4.1% 5.6% 
Note: State-Dominated group includes firms with state ownership more than 50 per cent. Non-State-Dominated 
group includes firms with state ownership less than 50 per cent. Other variables defined in table I. 
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Table7 
Robustness tests: control firm size and industry effects 
Panel A: Regression of ROE on characteristics of board 
(1) (2) 
Coeff P-value Coeff 
Intercept -!.031 0.860 -0.283 
REWARD 0.146 0.009 0.140 
PSHARE 0.714 0.003 0.713 
DINDEP 2.351 0.113 2.376 
DSTATE 0.784 0.333 0.824 
SIZE -0.094 
DUAL 0.833 
PAGE 0.538 
PNREWARD 0.015 
PINS IDE -!.591 
Control Variables: 
TA 0.969 0.051 1.003 
Industry! 0.057 0.983 0.113 
Industry2 -0.990 0.521 -0.992 
Industry3 -0.720 0.692 -0.694 
Industry4 -0.972 0.645 -0.791 
Industry5 !.085 0.685 !.115 
lndustry6 -2.761 0.241 -2.569 
R-square 4.28% 3.47% 
Panel B: Regressions of ROE on characteristics of boards conditional on state ownership 
P-value 
0.963 
0.015 
0.003 
0.120 
0.317 
0.540 
0.481 
0.881 
0.992 
0.511 
0.048 
0.966 
0.522 
0.706 
0.711 
0.679 
0.281 
(!)STATE-Dominating (2)Non- STATE Dominating 
Coeff P-value Coeff P-value 
Intercept -4.911 0.5938 1.181 0.895 
REWARD 0.044 0.6386 0.207 0.004 
PSHARE -!.163 0.7591 0.682 0.006 
DINDEP 3.475 0.0618 -0.292 0.905 
STATE 0.131 0.0429 -0.069 0.198 
TA 0.742 0.2784 0.935 0.210 
Industry Dummies Yes Yes 
R-square 1.5% 7.0% 
Note: TA is log of total asset. According to Industry Classification Guidance issued by Chinese Securities 
Regulatory Commission, each listed firms is assigned an industry code from 'A' to 'M'. We construct 
our industry dummies according to the industry codes. Industry I includes Agriculture, Forestry, Fishing 
and Hunting, corresponding to code 'A', Industry 2 includes Mining, Manufacturing, and Electricity, 
corresponding to code 'B', 'C' and 'D', Industry 3 includes Construction, Transportation and Information 
industries, corresponding to 'E', 'F' and 'G', Industry 4 includes wholesalers and retailers, corresponding 
to 'H'. Industry 5 includes Financing and Real Estate, corresponding to T and 'J', Industry 6 includes 
Service and Media, corresponding to 'K' and 'L' , Industry 7 includes Comprehensive and others, 
corresponding to 'M'. The regressions include dummies for Industry 1- Industry 6. State-Dominated 
group includes firms with state ownership more than 50 per cent. Non-State Dominated group includes 
firms with state ownership less than 50 per cent. Other variable definitions in Table I. 
D
ow
nl
oa
de
d 
by
 [S
ing
ap
or
e M
an
ag
em
en
t U
niv
ers
ity
] a
t 2
0:4
2 0
1 A
ug
us
t 2
01
7 
Dongping Han, Fusheng Wang, and Heng Yue 
Asia-Pacific Journal of Accounting & Economics 11 (2004) 77-94 
91 
we include other control variables in this section. Specifically we control firm size and 
industry effects. Firm size is measured as a log of total assets. Industries are defined based 
on the industry codes assigned by the Shanghai or Shenzhen Exchange Markets. In 2001, 
the Chinese Securities Regulatory Commission issued "Industry Classification Guidance", 
which requires listed firms be classified into an industry according to their major opera-
tion income. Following the guidance, the Shanghai and Shenzhen Exchange Markets 
assigned each firm a code, ranging from 'A' to 'M' .7 We constructed seven industry dum-
mies based on these codes. More detailed classification produced similar results. 
The regressions controlling firm size and industry effects are shown in Table 7. The 
results are similar to results shown in Table 4 and Table 6. 
5.2 Use Market-to-Book Ratio as dependent variable 
Although we prefer the accounting measurement of firm performance, we use a mar-
ket -based measurement for the robustness tests. 8 The benefit of market -based measurement 
is that it includes the market expectation of the firm's future growth, which may be related 
to board structure and political influence. We use the log of market-to-book ratio as our 
dependent variable and rerun regressions in Table 4 and Table 6. We also control size and 
industry effects. The results are shown in Table 8. 
Panel A of Table 8 indicates that rewards and stock ownership of directors are posi-
tively related to market-to-book ratios, consistent with the results in Table 4. The only 
difference is that the existence of independent directors and the state ownership are not 
marginally significant anymore. Other variables are not significant, as in the previous 
table. Panel B includes regressions in sub-samples of the state-dominated and non-state-
dominated groups. For the state-dominated group, we find that the reward is significant 
while the dummy of independent directors is insignificant. For the non-state-dominated 
group, we find reward and ownership shares are both significant and consistent with pre-
vious results. In addition, we find again that state ownership has different effects on firm 
performance conditional on whether state ownership is dominating, and the effects are 
significant in both groups. 
In summary our results are robust as to size effects, industry effects and the use of 
market-based measurement of firm performance. 
6. Conclusions 
We investigated the relationship between board characteristics and performance for 
listed firms in China. Using ROE to measure firm performance, we found appropriate 
rewards, stock ownership of directors, and the existence of independent directors helps to 
improve firm performance. We found no results that board size, aged directors, insider 
7 Each industry can be further classified into sectors. 
'We thank the referee for this suggestion. 
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Table 8 
Robustness tests: Use market-to-book as dependent variable 
Panel A: Regression of ME on characteristics of board 
(1) (2) 
Coeff P-value Coeff 
Intercept 6.341 0.001 6.253 
REWARD 0.008 0.004 0.007 
PSHARE 0.033 0.003 0.033 
DINDEP 0.064 0.356 0.048 
DSTATE -0.013 0.731 -0.006 
SIZE 0.007 
DUAL 0.081 
PAGE 0.151 
PNREWARD 0.098 
PINS IDE -0.033 
Control Variables: 
TA -0.380 0.001 -0.382 
Industry! -0.223 0.073 -0.225 
Industry2 -0.219 0.003 -0.229 
Industry3 -0.049 0.564 -0.076 
lndustry4 -0.270 0.006 -0.275 
Industry5 0.199 0.113 0.185 
lndustry6 -0.158 0.152 -0.176 
R-square 39.8% 40.0% 
Panel E: Regressions of ME on characteristics of boards conditional on state ownership 
P-value 
0.001 
0.010 
0.003 
0.495 
0.882 
0.312 
0.142 
0.367 
0.171 
0.769 
0.001 
0.071 
0.002 
0.375 
0.006 
0.142 
0.112 
(!)STATE-Dominating (2)Non- STATE Dominating 
Coeff P-value Coeff P-value 
Intercept 6.017 0.001 6.729 0.001 
REWARD 0.012 0.012 0.005 0.087 
PSHARE -0.167 0.390 0.032 0.003 
DINDEP 0.084 0.378 0.035 0.744 
STATE 0.007 0.037 -0.005 O.o28 
TA -0.388 0.001 -0.398 0.001 
Industry Dummies Yes Yes 
R-square 35.7% 42.4% 
Note: The dependent variable is MB, the log of market-to-book ratio. Other variables are defined in previous 
tables. 
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directors or CEO/Chair duality can affect firm performance. We also found that there are 
political influences on the relationship between board characteristics and firm perform-
ance. According to the levels of state ownership, different board characteristics take effect. 
In the non-state-dominated group, rewards and shares ownership are important to firm 
performance while in the state-dominated group, the existence of independent directors 
has an effect. Also state ownership is associated with firm performance in both groups. In 
the non-state-dominated group, state ownership is negatively related to operating per-
formance while in the state-dominated group, the relationship is positive. 
Our paper has several limitations. First, we only document the relationship between 
firm performance and the characteristics of boards but we cannot infer whether the rela-
tionship is a causal relationship. Previous research suggests firm performance and board 
characteristics may be simultaneously decided. Secondly, we have only analyzed data in 
one year, therefore we can neither examine if our evidence will apply to other time periods 
nor how the relations vary over time. Notwithstanding these limitations, our empirical 
results draw a picture about the effectiveness of board of directors in China and will help 
policy making. Future research should extend the time period and examine why specific 
board characteristics can improve firm performance. 
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